Politics in the Council is Janus-faced. There is bargaining with identifiable winners and losers, yet the voting records show high levels of agreement. These two sides have almost exclusively been studied in isolation even though standard theoretical models of voting typically assume that actors' behavior is guided by their positions relative to the proposal and the status quo. By combining positional data and voting data, we evaluate to what extent voting is driven by salience-weighted issue-specific positions. Our results show that governments' voting behavior are guided by their issue-specific positions. The relationship between preference-based positions and votes is stronger when we impute values for the missing positions in the positional data. This illustrates the importance of cautious treatment of missing data in EU decision-making.
Voting in the Council is often described as consensual (Lewis, 2000; Heisenberg, 2005;  Hayes- Renshaw and Wallace, 2006) . Voting records were first released in the 1990s and these records revealed high levels of unanimous votes even in policy areas where a qualified majority of the weighted votes would have sufficed (Mattila and Lane, 2001) . The low level of public contestation led Heisenberg (2005) to argue that the Council is "the institution of 'consensus' in the European Union", a result of more than 40-years of negotiations among the same partners. New Council members are immediately introduced to the norms governing this culture of consensus. Because of the high frequency of meetings and negotiations, the trust among the partners is high and reputation matters a lot. This allows for a diffuse form of reciprocity where the different actors do not expect their needs to be immediately accommodated (Lewis, 2000 (Lewis, , 2003 . Instead the actors engage in sequential exchange with long time horizons, which again facilitates a stable norm of consensus.
Bargaining in the Council is, on the other hand, characterized by diverging interests and continuous disagreements (Thomson, Stokman, Achen, and König, 2006; Thomson, 2011) . There are winners and losers in EU decision-making. Analyses employing positional data show that some governments manage to secure a policy outcome closer to their own preferences than others (Bailer, 2004; Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013) .
Hence, accounts of decision-making in the Council may at first sight seem contradictory. Studies that rely on positional data emphasize bargaining (e.g. Thomson et al, 2006) , while studies that rely on voting records emphasize the consensual nature of Council decision-making (e.g. Heisenberg, 2005) . The description of politics in the Council is thus dependent on which part of the decision-making process we wish to investigate as well as the available data sources. However, the different strands of the literature are compatible with each other. To account for both the bargaining stage and the voting stage, we combine voting data and positional data in order to test to what extent governments act in a utility maximizing manner when voting in the Council. Although the Council has a preference for deciding by unanimity, opposing votes are tabled. Govern-mental preferences on EU policies also differ from each other as revealed by positional data based on expert interviews (Thomson et al, 2006) . Linking the bargaining stage with the voting stage can thus tell us whether the governments that are on the losing side in the bargaining follow up by voting against the proposal. If such a relationship between preference-based positions and voting behavior is established, this may question the notion that the Council is "the institution of 'consensus' in the European Union" (Heisenberg, 2005; Lewis, 2000) .
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we evaluate to what extent governments base their voting decisions on a comparison between the old policy and the new policy, in line with the logic of a simple spatial model. In order to do this, we combine the positional data with voting data. The results show that there is a relationship between preference-based positions and voting behavior. A government that prefers the old policy over the new policy is more likely to vote against the new policy than a government that prefers the new policy over the old. Second, we show that different treatments of missing data in the positional data-set have an effect on the main results. This relationship is stronger when we account for the missing values in the positional data-set. Appropriate treatment of missing data is important for this type of analysis.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section relates our paper to the existing large-N literature on Council decision-making. There is a substantial literature on this matter. The common denominator in most of this literature is the assumption that Council members are rational actors (Mattila, 2004; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins, 2005; Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2009 ).
The second section presents a simple theoretical account of voting in the Council.
The purpose of this section is to explain why we may see such a high level of consensus if minsters simply vote in line with their issue-specific positions. We note that only successful legislation is recorded in the Council minutes concerning the (final) adoption of legal acts.
1 Cases where opposition actually has blocked the legislation at earlier stages in the decision-making are not a part of our data-set. Official voting records of adopted legislation thus under-report the actual aggregate level of disagreement in the Council.
The third section specifies the statistical model and the data we rely on for our investigation of Council voting. We combine positional data (Thomson et al, 2006) with voting records from the official minutes (Hagemann and Høyland, 2008) , and employ a hierarchical probit model of voting in the statistical analysis. The fourth section presents our results. The main result is that governments vote in line with their issue-specific positions. This finding is stronger when we impute the missing values in the positional data-set. In the concluding section, we discuss the implications of our findings for research on legislative politics in the EU.
Research on Council decision-making
Research on voting in the Council has made substantive progress over the last decade. This is partly due to increased data availability. While earlier research had to rely on insiders' accounts and more indirect measures, the push towards transparency in EU affairs following the Amsterdam treaty has dramatically increased the accessibility of data on Council decision-making (which can be illustrated by the the difference in the amount of data reported in Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997) and Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace (2006)).
There are two strands of studies in the quantitative literature on Council decisionmaking that focus on the relationship between the Council members, the representatives of the member state governments. The first strand uses voting data, while the second uses positional data. Both strands seek to determine the spatial distances between the different Council members and to map which members that have similar interests in the Council policy space. Both strands also share the same underlying theoretical assumption;
Council members are acting in line with instrumental rationality. Council members are assumed to behave in accordance with their preferences and beliefs. Actor alignment in the Council is a product of preferences and voting behavior (e.g. Mattila, 2004; Zimmer et al, 2005; Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2009 ). Bargaining success is more likely if an actor has less extreme preferences on issues that are salient to the actor (e.g. Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013) .
Both strands employ splits in preferences or votes to uncover which policy dimensions that are visible in Council decision-making. A left-right dimension, a pro-anti integration dimension, a small versus big countries dimension, a north-south dimension, and an old versus new member states dimension are the most commonly detected dimensions (Mattila, 2004; Heisenberg, 2005; Zimmer et al, 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Hagemann, 2007; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008; Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2009 ). Even so, there are disagreements between the two different strands on the strength of the findings and whether the identified structural dimensions are stable over time. Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman (2004) emphasis the lack of structure in the positions of the actors, and only find weak support for a north-south dimension and a dimension where the EP and the Commission prefer more policy changes than the member states in their analysis of EU15. Based on the same positional data source, Zimmer et al (2005) find stronger evidence for a north-south dimension than Thomson et al (2004) . Zimmer et al (2005) relabel this dimension as re-distributive, a conflict between the net-contributors and the net-beneficiaries of the EU budget. The left-right dimension is, however, only weakly supported by this study. The two studies differ in the choice of statistical model and somewhat in their treatment of missing data. Thomson et al (2004) Studies based on voting records (Mattila, 2004; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008) find more support for the left-right dimension and the pro-anti integration dimension than studies based on positional data. An illustration of the importance of the ideological left-right dimension in the Council is that new governments seem to prefer other coalition partners than their predecessors (Hagemann and Høyland, 2008) . After the eastern enlargement in 2004, a new-old alignment has been detected in both preferences and voting behavior (Thomson, 2009; Mattila, 2009) . Although this type of dimension is identified in both strands of the literature, the differences between the new and old member states are not strongly supported by the available data.
The existing literature thus exploits the observable disagreements in Council decisionmaking. However, these studies do not test whether the sources of disagreement in the two different data sources are interlinked with each other. Similarities in the findings suggest that they are. However, a government may choose to vote yes although it prefers the status quo to the the new policy. There could be several explanations for such voting behavior.
Knowing that it would be outvoted a government may simply accept its loss quietly and hoping that the loss will be compensated in future negotiations. König and Junge (2009) show that compensations, in the sense of logrolling, are a plausible explanation for the observed consensus in the Council. Governments can trade off utility across proposals that belong to the same policy area or proposals that are negotiated during the same time period. Choosing to be on the winning side of a vote may also be a government strategy in order to avoid unwanted attention from the media or the opposition at home.
Furthermore, the Commission preselects the proposals that are most likely to get adopted by the current configuration of Council members. Proposals that are likely to be contested by a majority of the Council members or by a majority of the members of the European Parliament (EP) are less likely to be initiated by the Commission. However, the Commission does not have perfect information with regard to the distribution of preferences in the Council and the EP. The Commission thus has to withdraw proposals that fail to find sufficient support in the Council, and in the EP (Kreppel, 1999; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999 (Häge, 2011) . It is not unlikely that member states' voting behavior on adopted legislation is different from behavior on non-adopted legislation. In fact, legislation only reach the final stage if most of the conflict has already been solved (Mühlböck, 2011) . Only final voting on adopted legislation is fully recorded in the minutes and the monthly summaries for the time frame considered in this paper.
2 Data on implicit voting at earlier stages in the process (at the working group level or at the ministerial level) is usually not publicly available (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006, 286) . At the ministerial level, the Council presidency keeps track of the positions of the Council members and tries to strike a compromise. If a compromise is not reached, the proposal is referred back to the working group level and the informal voting result will not be recorded in the minutes (Mühlböck, 2011 
A simple theory of voting in the Council
The underlying premise of the rational choice based literature on decision-making in the Council is that governments have preferences over policies, and act with the aim of moving policies closer to their most preferred policy-outcome (ideal-point) or to prevent policies that are further away from their ideal-point than the current policy (the status quo) from being adopted. Non-cooperative game theoretic models of decision-making in the EU have established the benefits of being agenda setters and veto players and the location of the decision outcome vis-a-vis the different actors under the different legislative procedures (Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996; Crombez, 1996; Moser, 1996; Scully, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000) . Our theoretical approach builds upon this literature.
However, rather than determining where on a dimension between the status quo and the Commission proposal a decision outcome is located under a given legislative procedure, we elaborate on when government i is more likely than not to record its opposition when voting on a legislative proposal.
If we assume that governments are sincere in their voting behavior, and their utilityfunction is a symmetric loss-function around their ideal-point, we would then expect government i to support a new proposal if its utility of the new proposal is higher than its utility of the status quo. thatx members need to support a proposal in order for it to be adopted. Only policies with midpoints located below the ideal point of government x or above the ideal point of governmentx can be adopted, any policy whose midpoint lies between x andx will not be supported by the necessary majority of governments, see figure 1.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Furthermore, we will not observe any successful vote on proposals whose midpoint is located inside the interval between government x andx. If any such policy is proposed, it will not be adopted. If proposals are multidimensional, governments can trade gains on one dimension (issue) against loss on another. Governments may attach different salience to each dimension (issue). Government i may hence compare the (salience-weighted) utility of a new proposal with the (salience-weighted) utility of the status quo, and cast a vote for the alternative that government i prefers the most.
If positions and the salience governments attach to the different dimensions are known, proposals that lack sufficient support will not be adopted, and opposition that is recorded in the final minutes will not be able to prevent the adoption of a proposal. This may lead us to wonder why governments bother to record their opposition. By so doing, they only achieve to demonstrate that they failed to prevent a proposal, that they initially were against, from being adopted. However, as voting in this case is inconsequential, there Hence, member states vote in line with their (salience-weighted) issue-specific positions as they could never be worse off and sometimes better off by voting in such a manner:
H 1 Governments vote in line with their (salience-weighted) issue positions.
In the statistical analysis we thus expect to see that positive utility of a proposal correlates with a positive vote while negative utility of a proposal correlates with a negative vote. In other words, negative utility of a proposal should decrease the probability of voting in favor of this particular proposal.
Method and Data
We combine positional data with corresponding voting data from the minutes of meetings in the Council in order to investigate whether issue-specific utility guides voting behavior.
We adopt a simple approach to exploring this relationship and do not control for other variables that may affect voting behavior and thus remedy the effect of issue-specific utility. Including other independent variables in our model distort the simplicity of our argument and open up a range of additional selection issues. For example controlling for the presidency would distort the effect of issue-specific positions if such positions also influenced which proposals the presidency put on the agenda. Also, whether an issue is decided as an A or B item may also be a function of the issue-specific positions of the governments. By keeping the statistical model as simple as possible, it is also applicable to similar contexts beyond the EU. Omitting case-specific variables only applicable to the EU setting ensure that our findings also can be relevant for other consensual decisionmaking settings like for instance the World Trade Organization, the Security Council of the United Nations, and the World Bank.
The first data-set, "Decision Making in the European Union" (DEU), consists of member states' policy positions on 174 controversial issues raised in 70 legislative proposals initiated by the Commission proposal (Thomson et al, 2006) . The information was collected through interviews with 125 experts. The legislative proposals were subjected to either the consultation procedure or the co-decision procedure. The proposals were introduced during or before December 2000, and were on the agenda in 1999 or 2000. The Commission, the European Parliament and the 15 member states were assigned positions.
The positions on each issue were estimated along a standardized policy scale with values between 0 and 100. The numerical differences between the actors reflect the political distance between them (Thomson and Stokman, 2003) . Also, the reference point (similar to the concept of status quo), the decision outcome of each issue, and the level of salience that each actor attached to each issue were defined along this continuum. With regard to salience, a score of 0 indicates that the issue was of no importance while a score of 100 indicates that the issue could hardly be more important. If governments vary in the salience they attach to the different issues, failure to take this into account may bias the results (Aksoy, 2012; Golub, 2012; Cross, 2013) . Warntjen (2012) compares salience measures provided by text analysis and media coverage with expert interviews and argues that the latter may provide a more fine-grained and less ambiguous measure of salience.
The second data-set contains the formal voting decisions and formal statements recorded in the Council minutes. The voting data is coded as binary decisions, and under qualified majority voting (QMV) both abstentions, negative votes and formal statements are coded as no votes in line with Hagemann and Høyland (2008) . In practice, abstentions have the same effect as no votes under QMV. Statements are included in the no votes group because these statements often consist of direct disagreement or serious concerns with regard to a proposal, and may be used to signal that the representative has stressed its position on a piece of legislation but was reluctant to take a more drastic step and prevent consensus (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007; Hagemann, 2008) . Formal statements are made following the adoption of a proposal and are included in the Council minutes or posted on the Council website. In the data-set negative votes are coded as 0 and yes votes as 1.
[ One objection to the choice of including negative statements in the negative votes category is that this type of disagreement may already be captured by the positionbased variable. However, since issuing a statement is a distinct type of behavior that departs from complete endorsement of the adopted proposal, we argue that acting upon a preference-based position can be done in the form of voting no, abstaining, or making a negative statement. Furthermore, interview data reveals that the increased usage of formal statements is a way of showing disagreement without creating gridlock (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007) . To make sure that our findings are not a result of this particular choice of coding scheme, we run our models with and without negative statements. Table   1 shows the frequencies of negative votes across the member states. Column 3 and 4 include negative statements while column 2 and 4 also include any additional negative votes retrieved from, if applicable, the non-final voting stage under the first reading of the co-decision procedure. 4 All four variations of our dependent variable are tested in the statistical analysis.
Dissent in published Council votes is rare. On the 46 pieces of legislation, that we were able to identify in the Council minutes that matched exactly with the DEU dataset, there were only 38 dissents in total (numbers from column 3 which includes negative statements). The number of dissents on any particular legislation ranged from 0 to 5.
On these votes, Portugal dissented 5 times while Ireland never dissented. The choice of including negative statements increases the mean of dissents from 0.5 to 0.8 (column 1 and 3) or from 0.57 to 0.89 if we take all negative votes into account (column 2 and 4).
In the positional data-set, the locations of the reference points (the policy that will prevail if no agreement) and the decision outcomes (the new policies) are used to determine the member state loss and gain with respect to their position on each issue. The reference point bears a close resemblance to the status quo concept. It differs from the normal usage of the status quo in the sense that for some proposals, a no agreement situation will lead to a break down of the existing arrangement (status quo) rather than the continuation of this arrangement (Thomson et al, 2006) . 46 of 70 policy proposals are listed in the Council minutes concerning the final adoption of legal acts. These 46 proposals had 118 issues.
Final adoption information in the Council minutes concerning the adoption of legal acts is missing for the remaining 56 issues nested in 24 policy proposals. Some information on these 24 proposals can be retrieved from the monthly summaries of Council acts (i.e. adoption date, voting rule, and whether the proposals were adopted with or without EP amendments in any second reading under co-decision). However, for reasons of data consistency we only employ the proposals listed in the Council minutes in our analysis.
[ Table 2 about here.]
With regard to the extent of missing values in the DEU data (Thomson et al, 2006) , The most common approach, taken by for example Selck and Steunenberg (2004) and Zimmer et al (2005) , when working with the DEU data-set, is to delete issues if there are missing values on more than four member state positions. Remaining missing values are then replaced by either the position of the Commission or the mean score between the reference point and the position of the Commission. The underlying assumption here is that member states that were not assigned a position during the expert interviews, were neutral actors on these issues. Since those Council members did not reveal a strong opinion on these issues, they were basically given a neutral position. While a mean/fixed value replacement approach is not uncommon when dealing with missing data, it has been criticized by statisticians (Little, 1992) and political methodologists (Honaker and King, 2010) alike. The key criticism with this approach is that it ignores the uncertainty by treating unknown data as if it is known.
The other alternatives to handle missing data are list-wise deletion or some multiple imputation technique. König, Finke, and Daimer (2005) (König et al, 2005) . Whether missing positions are extreme or neutral can thus be debated.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Arregui and Thomson (2009) show that large member states have fewer missing positions than small member states in the DEU data-set. They argue that this is due to the small member states being indifferent on more issues than the large member states as the small states are affected by fewer issues. Furthermore, some missing positions can be explained by the lack of relevance of this particular issue for the actors in question (Thomson, 2011) . While there are good reasons for considering missing positions as neutral positions, we can never be sure that actors with missing positions are in fact indifferent on these issues. Missing positions in the DEU data can also be due to the policy experts not remembering the actual positions of certain actors (Thomson et al, 2006) . Hence, multiple imputation, which takes the uncertainty of missing data into account, may be a better alternative than replacing missing values with the mean or some other fixed value (i.e. the position of the Commission). Thomson (2011, 42) argues that multiple imputation is inappropriate due to the large variation in actors' positions across issues, and resorts to mean-replacement or list-wise deletion in his study. This criticism would hold if we impute one actor's missing positions on the basis of this actor's positions on other issues. Our approach to missing is similar to that of König et al (2005) in that it, unlike mean-replacement, takes the associated uncertainty into account. However, it differs with regards to how it is implemented. The standard multiple imputation approach uses the variables in the data-set. In the case of König et al (2005) , it is augmented by additional information from extant data. The method fills in estimated values for missing data in multiple data sets prior to the analysis stage. The approach assumes that the data is distributed multivariate normal and if categorical, recoded into appropriate categories (for a critique and an alternative approach, see Cranmer and Gill, 2013 ) before running analysis on each individual data-set and reports the average effect and standard error. In contrast, the Bayesian approach treats missing data as parameters to be estimated alongside the other parameters in the model. The only assumption we make is that missing positions and salience data are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. 5 Then for each iteration of the Monte Carlo Markov chain the values on all parameters are updated conditional on the existing data and the parameter estimate of missing data and other parameters of the model (for an introduction to missing data imputation in the Bayesian framework, see Gelman and Hill, 2007, 529 -543) .
Only if data is missing completely at random (MCAR) is it safe to use list-wise deletion of observations with missing data. Missing completely at random means that 'none of the data collected or missing are relevant for explaining the chance of missingness' (Congdon, 2005, 380) . In most cases, that is a fairly strong assumption. List-wise deletion, the default in most statistical software, implies that all rows with missing data are deleted from the data-set. The best indication that this approach is taken is varying n across different model specifications. The requirement is that the MAR assumption holds. However, if missing is nonignorable and data is not missing at random (NMAR), it is necessary to model the process that generates missingness in order for data to become MAR. The key is to model the process that govern whether data is observed or missing. There are two main approaches, either to use auxiliary variables to model the missing-generating process or to rely on a simplified selection model (Little and Rubin, 2002) . It may be difficult to justify the model for missingness, or collect the auxiliary variables needed to model it properly. Due to these reasons we do not attempt to model the latter process (NMAR) in this paper.
Instead we investigate whether the choice of missing data treatment has an effect on the main results. We thus compare models where issues with more than four missing member state positions are deleted and the remaining missing positions are assigned a neutral position with models employing Bayesian imputation of missing values. The underlying assumption of the latter framework is that data is missing at random (MAR),
i.e. random after controlling for the co-variate. By estimating the value multiple times, a random element ensures that the values vary across the data-set, thereby ensuring that imputed observations have more uncertainty than observed observations. We use the 
Statistical models
We model vote choice as an absolute loss function of the salience-weighted issue-specific utility of the outcome compared to the reference point (rp):
where β is distributed multivariate normal, with prior mean 0 and precision .001.
We run two series of models: Failure to properly account for the missingness in the positional data may seriously bias the results. 8 We contrast the standard approach to modeling missing values in the DEU data (Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; Zimmer et al, 2005) , a combination of list-wise deletion and mean-replacement, with a multiple imputation approach. Issues where the reference point is missing are usually deleted in the previous studies. The reason for doing this is that one cannot assume that the reference point location of one proposal is determined by that of other proposals Junge, 2008, 2009 ). However, it is possible to impute the reference point on basis of the possible distribution of positions (0-100) within an issue.
The full imputation model implements such an approach while the baseline model deletes issues where the reference point is missing. Several objections to the imputation of missing reference points can be raised. Missing reference points may, for instance, be due to the fact that existing national policies vary across member states. Hence, it is difficult to determine what the actual reference point will be if the legislation fails. This uncertainty is, however, partly accounted for by the multiple imputation framework. Achen (2006) shows that the reference point is less influential than the procedural modeling tradition implies that it is. The reference point plays only a minor role in the negotiations if the decision outcome is far away from the reference point. The location of the decision outcome can thus be said to be more important when determining the utility loss of a government than the location of the reference point. Hence, we will argue that imputing reference points are acceptable as long as we have the location of the decision outcome on each issue. Note that our baseline model does not impute any missing reference points and thus serves as a robustness check. All models are estimated using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation. We ran 150 000 iterations, discarding the first 50 000. Standard convergence statistics indicate that all models had converged on the target distribution.
Results
The results need to be interpreted in light of the case selection. Only controversial proposals are included in the DEU data sample (Thomson et al, 2006) . The case selection could potentially bias the results. However, since the variation in preference distribution is likely to be greater when bargaining on a controversial proposal and such a proposal cannot be adopted without the support of most (or all) of the governments, the effect of utility could potentially be stronger when uncontroversial proposals are adopted. This because the negotiations on uncontroversial proposals may result in fewer policy losers and thus more policy winners than the negotiations on controversial proposals.
The results are presented in table 4 and 5. The main result is that issue-specific positions can account for the variation in voting pattern that we observe in the Council.
We thus find support for [H 1 ]. The effect of utility on voting is positive and robust across all models regardless of missing treatment, coding scheme of the dependent variable, and salience-weighting of the positions. In table 4 and 5, the effect of utility is distinguishable from zero in all models. This can be inferred from the fact that the 95 % credibility interval (confidence interval in the frequentist approach) does not overlap zero.
The effect of issue-specific positions is substantively larger in the models that impute all missing values than in the baseline models where issues with more than four missing member state positions are deleted and the remaining missing positions are given the mean score between the reference point and the Commission. This suggests that standard approaches to studying decision-making in the Council may not capture the full effect of preference-based positions, in particular if the problem of missing data is ignored. When the baseline approach to modeling missing data is employed, only 68 percent of the dataset remains after deleting issues with missing reference point and/or more than four missing member state positions. Hence, the full imputation approach ensures more data while at the same time taking the uncertainty of the distribution of missing values into account. This results in a stronger relationship between positions and votes.
[ Table 4 about here.]
[ Table 5 about here.]
We will now provide a more detailed discussion of the estimates, before moving on to the substantive effects. Tables 4 and 5 While the choice of missing treatment has a substantial effect on the results, the different coding schemes for the dependent variable vote choice matter less. For the baseline models, the effect of utility is almost the same across all model specifications except when all possible opposition is included in the no category of the dependent variable (all votes (including first round of co-decision) and statements). In the full imputation models, the effect of utility on voting is somewhat greater when negative statements are not included in the no vote category of the dependent variable. Even, so the effect is still stronger in the full imputation models than the baseline models (beside from the exemption already mentioned above). Compared to the baseline model, the effect doubles when positions are salience-weighted and all possible variation is included the dependent variable (see the last row in table 5). In the full imputation models, the finding that the effect of positions on voting is stronger when statements are not included in the dependent variable is interesting. A plausible explanation for this finding may be that while government i votes down a proposal as a whole, it may issue a negative statement directed toward a specific issue within a proposal. If the latter is the case, government i's mean position on all issues within a proposal can be positive, while the vote choice under this particular coding scheme will be negative if government i is issuing a negative statement on a particular issue in a multi-issue proposal. Our results indicate that such a scenario occurs but that it does not happen often enough to significantly affect the results.
There is a substantial difference between the baseline models and the full imputation models when we calculate the predicted probabilities to vote against or in favor under a Second, the effect is stronger when positions are weighted for salience. Third, the estimated effects are larger when missing data is imputed. Nevertheless, a key feature of the figure is also the high predicted probability of voting in favor of the proposal, regardless of the relative position, which serves as a reminder that we only observe disagreement on adopted legislation. It is clear that the governments, regardless of their issue-specific policy positions, have a higher probability of voting yes than no. However, as already alluded to, our data-set does not include any votes on proposals where the Council fails to find a qualified majority. In other words, the models are only able to provide estimated probabilities that are conditional on the legislation actually being adopted. Our research design thus limits the scope of research to the link between stated preferences and actual observed voting. In order to understand the full effect of positions on voting, we would need verifiable information about the location of any alternative proposals that are considered during the legislative process.
Conclusion
We Preference-related voting behavior may also be said to increase the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making. It shows that the preferences of the governments are not fully erased by the bargaining, and that the governments seek to pursue the interests of their domestic constituencies throughout the decision-making process. Showing that preferences are associated with the voting stage is the first contribution that our analysis makes to the existing literature. The similarities in the findings between studies that employ voting data and studies that employ preference-based data are thus validated by our analysis. The second contribution is that different treatments of missing data have an effect on the main finding. The relationship between preferences and votes is stronger when missing values in the positional data are imputed on an iteration by iteration basis. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that the salience attached to the proposal by the individual governments matters for their voting behavior. The relationship between preferences and voting behavior is stronger when we control for salience.
Recorded Council votes are not in any meaningful sense a random sample. Nor do they represent the universe of all decisions taken in the Council within the time-frame of the study. Instead, they represent a bias selection. The recorded votes are biased as it is only votes on legislation that is adopted that enter into the data-set. This means that the observed consensus culture in the Council may be a product of this selection bias. When opposition is successful, legislation will not be adopted. The high level of consensus in the Council may also be a combination of the following: 1) mainly uncontroversial legislation is adopted and 2) governments put forward a show of unity rather than voting sincerely.
A model that incorporates the selection bias may capture whether this is actually the case.
While observers of voting in the Council are surely aware of the selection bias in the reported votes, nobody has explicitly modeled voting in the Council in a selection model framework. We believe that future research can benefit from incorporating selection aspects explicitly into the analysis. This can be done by modeling the process that determine whether data is observed or missing (NMAR). Incorporating a simplified selection model in the statistical analyses is an example of how this approach can be implemented (Little and Rubin, 2002) . Such an approach requires that we have information on votes that
were not taken because of the majority requirement, or if taken, failed to meet this requirement. It would also be useful to supplement voting data with indicators of dissent that are less prone to the same selection bias, for example data on implementation of EU legislation (König and Luetgert, 2009; Luetgert and Dannwolf, 2009; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009 ).
Selection bias is not confined to Council voting. Research on roll call voting in the European Parliament may also suffer from a selection bias (Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montgomery, and Schambach, 2006; Hug, 2008, 2009 ).
Selection models could be incorporated into a general framework in order to investigate the extent of the potential selection bias in European Parliament roll call votes.
Notes 1 see http://consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/council-minutes.
2 The Council secretariat notes that the public votes database from 2006 and onwards is considered to have complete data on both final voting and voting on the common position under co-decision.
3 The assumption that voting behavior is sincere can be discussed. Since we lack data on disagreement in the early stages of bargaining, the direct link between preferences and votes is not a clear cut one.
However, to simplify the model we assume that voting behavior is sincere.
4 The non-final voting stage (the adoption of the common position in the Council) of the co-decision procedure is only applicable to the co-decision proposals that were adopted at later stages than the first reading. The votes on the common positions are retrieved from the Monthly summaries of Council acts, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/.
5 We rescale positions and salience estimates by dividing by 100, see the Statistical models section.
Hence, we assume that the missing values also are distributed between 0 and 1. The original distribution of the measures are between 0 and 100 as mentioned before.
6 In our positional data-set that can be matched with the Council minutes, list-wise deletion reduces the number of rows in the data-set from 118 to 56. Only 0.47 of the original data-set remains for analysis after the list-wise deletion.
7 It is possible to employ other measures of issue level utility (i.e. a city block measure or weighted Euclidean distances) than the measures employed here. These measures are more complex than the chosen mean approach. Given the limited number of proposals in our data-set, we will leave the exploration of other utility measures to further research.
8 When employing the conservative measure (without formal statements as part of the no category) of our dependent variable vote choice, three proposals have missing positions and/or salience estimates for one or more member state(s) that engaged in negative voting behavior on these particular proposals.
These cases (CNS/1998 /347, COD/1999 /244, and CNS/1996 ) illustrate why it is feasible to model missing values explicitly.
Location of midpoint between proposal and SQ
x x adopted adopted not adopted Figure 1 : Cut-point figure. Any proposal whose midpoint is between x andx will not be adopted. For policy-moves to the right (left) the midpoint between the status quo and the proposal has to be to the left (right) of x (x). Zimmer et al (2005) missing replaced by mean score between reference point and Commission position list-wise deletion ≥ 5 missing positions König et al (2005) 3 different measures: 1)multiple imputation (Amelia)
2) measure of indifference 3) conditional averaging algorithm Junge (2008, 2009) multiple imputation (Amelia) Thomson (2011) mean average of all positions 
